StressingLLMs OpenCode Benchmark Results

Here is a link to the StressingLLMs OpenCode benchmark results. The process consisted of replicating my StressingLLMs tests using models available through OpenCode. I evaluated 11 models, most of which were free: Muse Spark 1.3, Muse Spark 1.2, Big Pickle, Nemotron 3 Ultra, Ling 3.0 Flash, MiMo v2.5, and Nemotron 3.5 Lightning. I also tested four paid models: GPT 6 Astra, Claude Fable 5.1, GLM, and Kimi K3. Altogether, I spent about $100. I don’t understand how people afford to benchmark models regularly. Claude and GPT 6 could chew through $20 in less than an hour.

The results are fun to explore. Most of the free models performed on par with the local models. The free model that surprised me most was Muse Spark 1.3. It was able to write a decryptor for an executable with 57 rounds, which is basically a cryptographic hashing workload, but failed at 58 rounds. GLM 5.2 made it to 67 rounds before failing. GPT 6 Astra and Claude Fable 5.1 both completed 68 rounds. Shortly after reaching those numbers, I stopped testing because my curiosity wasn’t worth the cost.

Based on the runs I completed, I estimated the cost, token usage, and time required for a single run. These figures are available in the “Estimated Single-Attempt Resources” table. According to the estimate, a single 10,000-round run using Claude Fable 5.1 would cost $239.14, take 4.7 hours, and use 118.9 million tokens. There’s no way to know whether this estimate is accurate without actually running the test, but it’s still fun to explore.

That highlights an important point about the page: I created it as a way to explore the data, and its results should not be treated as absolute.

One section I recommend exploring is the “Roadmap” table. Clicking the checkboxes displays the corresponding results and submission. It’s fascinating to see how different models approached the same problem.

Stressing LLMs Local Model Results

For anyone interested in seeing a final version of the local model results for Stressing LLMs, I created a results page hosted on GitHub pages. 

https://alexander-hanel.github.io/StressingLLMs/

Cheers. 

Alex

Exploring APTNotes with LLMs

I’d like to share a few projects I’ve been working on.

The first project is APTNotes-md, which is APTNotes converted to Markdown format. If you’ve never heard of APTNotes, it’s a GitHub repository of APT-related threat intelligence reports in PDF format, organized by year. I created APTNotes-md for anyone who wants to explore the data using large language models. APTNotes-md contains additional reports that I added because the original project was last updated in 2024.

The second project is feed-report-monitor, a pipeline for converting RSS feeds into PDF and Markdown files. It relies on RSS, Python, Marker, PyTorch, Ollama, and local models. This pipeline was also used to convert the APTNotes PDFs into Markdown. Converting 869 PDFs took about five days on a DGX Spark. The process could have been significantly faster, but I chose to use a local gemma:26b model to verify that the Markdown conversion was formatted correctly.

The third project is report-eval. This project has been both the most fascinating and the most frustrating, so I guess it balances itself out.The project started as an attempt to build a SQLite database populated with metadata and attributes extracted from the reports in APTNotes-md. The goal was to allow an agent to answer questions such as, “Summarize all reports related to Operation Aurora,” returning both the results and their supporting sources using xSQL. Populating the database sounded simple: create a set of questions, have an agent build an evaluation harness, then iterate over every report and ask every question. It turned out to be anything but simple.

The report-eval project was restarted two or three times. To give you an idea of how bad it got, one Saturday night I became so frustrated that I switched to GPT-5.6 Sol Ultra, typed “fix this,” and went to bed.

Pro tip: don’t do this.

The next morning my weekly usage limit was at 0%, with six days remaining until it reset. I managed to burn through an entire week’s worth of tokens while I was asleep. I ended up using one of my four resets just to get the harness into a working state. In retrospect, I should have reviewed the plan in more details before repeatedly saying yes. After realizing it would take another four days to process all of the reports locally using gemma:26, I decided to use OpenAI to perform the report classification instead. I quickly burned through the rest of my resets over the next day or two and temporarily signed up for the Pro plan to finish processing the reports.

If you’re interested in learning from my mistakes, check out the after-action report. If you’d like to see some of the reasoning failures and pitfalls I encountered along the way, take a look at fallacies.md. A couple of the points could be a full blogpost. The results of the current eval can be found here. 

Below are some results of the eval using Codex. 

Note: Start of AI Generated content

Main findings

gemma4:26b completed the corpus and produced relatively few final errors:

• 22 timeouts
• 17 unsupported status values
• 2 malformed evidence errors

gemma4:31b-it-qat was stopped after reaching approximately 4.48% of the corpus.

• All 416 failures were caused by empty answers.
• The model commonly returned status: "not_stated" with answer: "".
• This appears to be a response-format contract problem rather than necessarily an analytical failure.

hermes3:8b was stopped after approximately 15.57% of the corpus.

• 913 failures were empty answers.
• 928 used unsupported status labels such as stated, confirmed, or attributed.
• Only six failures came from timeouts or malformed evidence.
• About 99.7% of its recorded failures were therefore output-schema or validation failures.

openai-terra-high has no recorded mechanical errors, but this does not prove every classification is semantically correct. 

• The files contain no explicit correctness score or gold-label field.

Data-quality issue

• gemma4:26b contained 901 duplicated report/question pairs, adding 918 surplus rows. These appear to be retries appended to existing files.
• Using the raw rows gives gemma4:26b 423 errors, but many older failures were later corrected. Selecting the newest generated_at result reduces its current failure count to 41. Results should therefore be deduplicated before analysis.

Most problematic question categories

Within the partial Hermes run, the highest observed failure rates included:

• attacker_ai_use: 129/129 failed
• staging: 113/129 failed
• credential_access: 111/129 failed
• attribution_reported_confidence: 105/130 failed
• attribution_claim_source: 104/130 failed
• privilege_escalation: 98/129 failed
• exfiltration: 97/129 failed

These concentrations mostly reflect the same response-contract problems, especially blank not_stated answers and unsupported status terminology.

Overall conclusion

The dominant failures were not clearly incorrect APT classifications. They were failures to follow the required JSON answer contract. gemma4:26b successfully completed the evaluation after retries, while the two stopped models repeatedly produced responses rejected by the validator. Semantic correctness should be evaluated separately by comparing normalized labels against a designated reference set.

Note: End of AI Generated Content

Stressing LLMs - Local Model Complexity Attacks Progress

Hello, this is an ongoing personal learning series on Large Language Models (LLMs) and automated reverse engineering. In a previous blog post, I described a type of complexity attack against LLMs. I am using "attack" in the practical reverse-engineering sense: intentionally increasing the amount of interdependent code and state the model has to reason about. My hypothesis is that increasing the number of interdependent round functions increases the chance that a model will make a small but fatal translation error, even when it identifies the correct high-level algorithm. Here is an excerpt from that blog post that describes the methodology I'm using.

The complexity attack increases computational complexity by generating binaries with a large number of interdependent functions. Instead of hiding the logic, the goal is to make the amount of state and code too large for practical static reasoning. The executable contains a toy XOR cipher with a keystream derived from a set of N functions, where N is the number of generated rounds. A Python script generates C source code with an embedded encrypted string and decryption loop. GCC is then used to compile the C source into an executable. At runtime, the decrypted string is printed to the console. To make this concrete, we can walk through generating the code and compiling it.

What is useful about this approach is that I can measure the complexity of the generated binaries and then test them against an LLM. At first glance, this sounds easy, but there are a lot of nuances to running models locally. For example, one model started to fail after I updated Ollama. In this blog post, I'm going to describe the results, themes of failures and lessons learned. Before diving into those, I think it's worth mentioning the hardware and tooling.

I'm running all of the local models on a DGX Spark and using OpenAI's Codex as an agent. On the Spark, I use Python and Bash for all of the scripting and tool execution, clearbluejar's pyghidra-mcp within Docker to interact with Ghidra, and Ollama to interact with models. I'm using the following models for evaluation:

• gemma4:26b
• qwen3.6:35b
• qwen3-coder:30b
• mistral-small3.2:24b
• command-r:35b
• cogito:32b
• hermes3:8b

I attempted to download and use a number of other models, but they did not work because they were not accessible via MCP, timed out, or had other similar issues. Before I dig too deep into the evaluation process and data, I wanted to share the results of the most recent evaluation. In these runs, gemma4:31b is clearly the best local baseline. gemma4:26b was historically successful, but it became unstable after updating Ollama. qwen3.6:35b was able to solve fixtures (e.g. binary test case) 0001 and 0002 after updating the prompt.   Below is a table of the results from 102 runs. Please note that the results improved over time with updates to the prompt, so this should be read as a practical lab notebook rather than a perfectly controlled benchmark.

model	rows	verified	completed false	timeouts	other inconclusive	successful fixtures
gemma4:31b	15	11	2	2	0	0001, 0002, 0003, 0004 across later runs
gemma4:26b	23	10	8	3	2	mostly 0001, plus 0002 and 0003
qwen3.6:35b	11	2	6	1	2	0001, 0002
qwen3-coder:30b	9	0	8	0	1	none
qwen3.5:35b	4	0	2	1	1	none
cogito:32b	9	0	8	0	1	none
command-r:35b	9	0	8	0	1	none
mistral-small3.2:24b	9	0	8	0	1	none
hermes3:8b	9	0	8	0	1	none
lfm2:24b	4	0	4	0	0	none

The following table is from the last run in which gemma4:31b was able to successfully write a decryptor for binaries with 1, 2, and 3 rounds of XOR functions.

model	fixture	rounds	final grade	completed	decryptor correct	py blocks	status	elapsed sec	MCP calls	error
gemma4:31b	/fx_r0001_sl0016_sp0000_dwarf.exe-2f588b	0001	true	True	True	1	completed	958.73	8
gemma4:31b	/fx_r0002_sl0016_sp0000_dwarf.exe-861fc4	0002	true	True	True	1	completed	1101.385	11
gemma4:31b	/fx_r0003_sl0016_sp0000_dwarf.exe-135f91	0003	true	True	True	1	completed	918.604	9
gemma4:31b	/fx_r0004_sl0016_sp0000_dwarf.exe-9f4750	0004	inconclusive_timeout	False	False	0	ollama_timeout	2287.903	10	TimeoutError: timed out
qwen3.6:35b	/fx_r0001_sl0016_sp0000_dwarf.exe-2f588b	0001	true	True	True	2	completed	414.498	23
qwen3.6:35b	/fx_r0002_sl0016_sp0000_dwarf.exe-861fc4	0002	true	True	True	4	completed	281.356	13
qwen3.6:35b	/fx_r0003_sl0016_sp0000_dwarf.exe-135f91	0003	false	True	False	1	completed	304.465	29

The analysis of the 4-round binary timed out after 1800 seconds (30 minutes). Previous runs were able to decrypt 4-round binaries, but not 5-round binaries. There is evidence in this setup that the models start to degrade as the binary becomes more complex, but the results are still inconclusive.

Failures

Disclaimer: The failure report was generated using AI. I personally find the failures fascinating.

The failures cluster around a small set of reverse-engineering translation hazards:

• uint32_t + uint32_t wrapping before a later uint64_t cast
• C unsigned literal widths, especially constants ending in u
• C cast timing, such as (uint64_t)(expr) where expr was already evaluated at 32 bits
• CONCAT44(a,b) high/low argument interpretation
• C operator precedence involving +, ^, |, <<, and >>
• 64-bit rotate idioms such as (x << 21) | (x >> 43)
• final derive_state accumulator behavior and final xorshift32(...)
• preserving byte order from mixed character/hex array initializers
• implementing every generated round function in order

The most interesting lesson so far is that the models often do the hard-looking part first. They find the right functions, recover the encrypted bytes, and understand the XOR loop. The thing that breaks them is often much smaller: one C integer-width rule, one cast at the wrong time, or one generated round translated almost-but-not-quite correctly.

1. The Hardest Failures Are Now Translation Errors, Not Tool Access

The strongest models usually find the right region of the binary: main, derive_state, xorshift32, encrypted bytes, and the generated round functions.

The most important remaining failure class is translating C/Ghidra semantics into Python exactly. This shows up as scripts that look plausible, run successfully, but print non-plaintext bytes.

Note: 20260611-** is the id of the run 

Confirmed examples:

• gemma4:31b, 20260611-aa, fixture 0004

  • The model recovered the right functions and wrote a full decryptor.
  • Failure was in R3: it translated (uint64_t)(0xc8e57b40u + m) as a wide Python addition instead of u64(u32(0xc8e57b40 + m)).
  • One-line fix made the script print Hello, World.

• gemma4:31b, 20260611-cc, fixture 0005

  • Same root cause in R3.
  • Correct C: p->b ^= (uint64_t)(0xc8e57b40u + m);
  • Model Python missed the 32-bit wrap before widening.
  • One-line fix made the script print Hello, World.

This is best classified as incorrect-reasoning with a bad-type-recovery or cast-timing secondary cause.

2. Prompt Updates Improved gemma4:31b, but Did Not Fully Solve Cast Timing

gemma4:31b improved materially after prompt changes. In 20260611-cc, it solved fixtures 0001 through 0004 and failed on 0005. Earlier, in 20260611-aa, it solved 0001 through 0003 and failed 0004.

The remaining 0005 failure shows that telling the model to use ctypes is not enough. The model imported or mentioned fixed-width behavior but still used raw Python arithmetic for a critical intermediate expression.

The prompt now needs to force helper usage, not just mention ctypes:

def u32(x): return ctypes.c_uint32(x).value
def u64(x): return ctypes.c_uint64(x).value

Critical translation rule:

(uint64_t)(a_uint32 + b_uint32) -> u64(u32(a + b))

This is the kind of bug that makes the benchmark useful to me. The model is not completely lost, but it is also not correct. That middle zone is where a lot of reverse-engineering automation gets interesting.

3. gemma4:31b Is the Current Best Local Baseline

gemma4:31b has the strongest completed results:

• 20260611-aa: solved 0001, 0002, 0003; failed 0004.
• 20260611-cc: solved 0001, 0002, 0003, 0004; failed 0005.
• 20260611-dd: solved 0001, 0002, 0003; timed out on 0004.

It is slow, but its failures are now narrow and mechanically diagnosable.

4. gemma4:26b Is Historically Useful but Unstable

gemma4:26b has repeated successes, mostly on fixture 0001, and solved 0001 through 0003 in 20260611-bb.

However, it also regressed repeatedly:

• wrong decryptor output on fixture 0001 in some runs
• timeouts on early fixtures
• empty or pseudo-tool response on fixture 0002
• inconsistent ability to proceed past fixture 0001

It remains useful as a historical baseline, but it is not as reliable as gemma4:31b.

5. qwen3.6:35b Became Interesting in Later Runs

Earlier qwen3.6:35b runs mostly produced invalid or non-printing Python, timed out, or failed to converge.

In 20260611-dd, it solved fixtures 0001 and 0002, then failed fixture 0003 with invalid/malformed Python. That suggests it is not merely MCP-compatible; it can solve the simpler generated fixtures under some settings. It still degrades as round complexity increases.

6. Many Models Are Tool-Compatible but Do Not Converge

Several models can call MCP tools but fail to produce a usable decryptor:

• command-r:35b
• lfm2:24b
• some qwen3.6:35b and qwen3.5:35b runs

These failures usually are not MCP server failures. They are either:

• tool use without a final algorithm
• excessive tool loops
• target drift
• loss of the objective after accumulating tool output

lfm2:24b is the clearest example: it used many MCP calls in some runs but did not produce a Python decryptor.

7. Smaller Models Often Stop Too Early

The most common pattern for mistral-small3.2:24b and hermes3:8b is minimal MCP usage followed by no decryptor.

These are mostly incomplete-xrefs failures:

• did not inspect enough of main
• did not inspect derive_state
• did not inspect all generated round functions
• did not recover the encrypted bytes and loop bounds

8. Invalid Python and Fence Extraction Remain Separate Problems

Some failures are model output quality problems:

• invalid Python syntax
• Markdown/prose inside extracted code
• several fenced blocks, none of which are a clean decryptor
• claimed plaintext inconsistent with script output

There is also a harness extraction issue observed in 20260611-cc for gemma4:31b fixture 0005: the saved block_0.py was not the explicit Python block. It captured Markdown around the recovered-output prose because earlier c fences confused the plain-fence extractor. The actual Python block in answer.md ran, but printed wrong bytes until the R3 cast-timing bug was fixed.

This means two separate checks are needed:

1. Did the model write a correct Python decryptor?
2. Did the extraction harness capture the intended Python block?

Back to non-AI-ish text.

Limitations

There are a few caveats worth calling out before the conclusion. The prompt changed during the study, and some of the later improvements came from manually comparing generated Python against the original C and feeding that back into the prompt. Ollama updates may also have changed model behavior, especially for gemma4:26b. There was also at least one harness extraction issue where the saved Python block was not the intended final decryptor. Finally, timeouts are inconclusive. They show that the run did not finish inside the configured timeout, not that the model could never solve the fixture.

That means the results are best read as evidence from one local setup, not a universal ranking of models or a final statement about LLM reverse-engineering ability.

Conclusion

More rounds do not make solving impossible, but they substantially increase the chance of failure once a model must preserve a longer state mutation chain.

The dominant complexity effect is not discovering the high-level XOR scheme. Models often find:

• main
• encrypted bytes
• seed
• derive_state
• xorshift32
• generated round functions

The failure emerges when translating every round exactly:

• more generated functions to implement
• more mutable state updates to preserve in order
• more C integer width boundaries
• more unsigned literal/cast timing traps
• more rotate and precedence opportunities for one-bit state errors

For this fixture generator, prompt, harness, and local model setup, the practical threshold appears to be:

rounds 1-3: solvable by gemma4:31b with good reliability
round 4: boundary where failures/timeouts start
round 5: current failure point for gemma4:31b

That conclusion should be treated as provisional because there are few high-round samples.

Next Steps

• Automated prompt improvement using failure analysis

  • This process was done manually by comparing the generated Python code against the original C code, then having the harness recommend upgrades to the prompt.
  • This substantially improved the results. qwen3.6 started working after the first iteration of this approach.

• Compare against frontier models.

• Keep learning and keep reading.

Any recommendations? I would love to hear feedback, hints or thoughts from others. Feel free to send me an email to Alexander dot Hanel at gmail dot com or leave a comment. Cheers.

Frost64

At my day job, I run a RE mentorship. It’s a simple process for me. I have a link to the task, and the user emails me the answers to the questions in the task. If their answers are correct, I send them the next task. If the answers are incorrect, I let them know their mistakes and send them references to help. Sometimes people get tripped up with learning Assembly, or they think it’s boring (which it kind of is). One tool I have always wanted was a way to gamify the learning of Assembly.  So, my vibe-coding weekend project was a SoftIce-like interface that teaches the basics of Assembly. It uses the Godot gaming engine, Unicorn-Engine for emulation, and iced. I hit my quota for the next couple of hours I figured I’d post a screenshot:

Overall I’m very happy with it. It’s a complete emulator, has correct addresses, bytes, validation and reminds me of SoftIce. I still need to audit the text in the lesson notes because they are duplicated in the command window text. Once it’s complete I’ll post the code to GitHub or maybe post the game on Steam.  

I’m still working on my Stressing LLMs project. Some local models that I tested failed miserably on writing basic python decryptors. I have been digging into proper prompts, skills.md and settings for Ghidra. That project should be out in a couple of weeks. 

Stressing LLMs - Triage Stage

Packers, cryptors, and code obfuscation are all methods used to bypass signature-based scanners in AV/EDR or to slow down the reverse engineering process. Many people are now using Large Language Models (LLMs) to reverse engineer or thwart these protections. It is increasingly common to see examples of frontier models solving CTF challenges or being used to port old video games to modern code. It is somewhat morbidly fascinating to consider how LLMs could drive an arms race with DRM systems.

When thinking about LLMs for reverse engineering, I keep asking: at what point does randomization degrade tokenization or code comprehension? This is a reasonable question in the context of compiled executables.

In my view, there are two types of potential attacks against LLMs in the context of static analysis of compiled binaries. The first is making the code so complex that the context size and token cost are no longer practical. The second, which I call “Tokenization Inflation,” attempts to inflate or fragment tokens to increase processing cost or reduce coherence. These “attacks” may not even be effective against LLMs, especially for trivial tasks, but they are still worth exploring. This is the first of two posts: this one outlines the approaches and code; the second tests the hypothesis.

Complexity Attack

The complexity attack increases computational complexity by generating binaries with a large number of interdependent functions. Instead of hiding the logic, the goal is to make the amount of state and code too large for practical static reasoning. The executable contains a toy XOR cipher with a keystream derived from a set of N functions, where N is the number of generated rounds. A Python script generates C source code with an embedded encrypted string and decryption loop. GCC is then used to compile the C source into an executable. At runtime, the decrypted string is printed to the console. To make this concrete, we can walk through generating the code and compiling it.

python gen_fixture.py generate --seed 0xdeadbeef --rounds 5 --symbol-len 16 --symbol-pad 0 --message "Hello, World" --out fixture.c
Wrote fixture.c
Generated symbol prefix length: 16
Compile with:
gcc -O0 -g3 -gdwarf-5 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-inline -std=c11 fixture.c -o fixture.exe

Here is fixture.c. There are 5 functions named TokenizerBench, which matches the number of rounds specified on the command line. If this were increased to 16,397 rounds, the generated binary would contain 16,397 functions.

// Generated CTF-style static-analysis fixture
//
// Suggested build:
//   gcc -O0 -g3 -gdwarf-5 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-inline -std=c11 fixture.c -o fixture.exe
//
// seed=0xdeadbeef
// rounds=5
// const_mode=rand
// const_seed=0xc001d00d
// symbol_len=16
// symbol_pad=0
// generated_prefix_length=16
//
// Notes:
// - Per-function constants are baked into each generated function.
// - Function bodies vary by generated round variant.
// - The plaintext is stored encrypted in the binary and decrypted at runtime.

#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stddef.h>

typedef struct TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens {
    uint64_t a;
    uint64_t b;
    uint64_t c;
} TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens;

static uint32_t xorshift32(uint32_t x) {
    x ^= x << 13;
    x ^= x >> 17;
    x ^= x << 5;
    return x;
}

__attribute__((used, noinline))
uint32_t TokenizerBench___R0(TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens *p) {
    uint32_t m1 = xorshift32(0x9336956du ^ 0x31bbf978u ^ (uint32_t)p->a);
    uint32_t m2 = xorshift32(0xcd6f55fcu ^ (uint32_t)p->b);
    p->a ^= ((uint64_t)m1 << 32) | (uint64_t)m2;
    p->b += (uint64_t)(0x9336956du ^ m2);
    p->b = (p->b << 10) | (p->b >> 54);
    p->c = (p->c + p->a) ^ (uint64_t)(0x31bbf978u ^ 0xcd6f55fcu);
    uint64_t r = p->a ^ p->b ^ p->c ^ (uint64_t)0x9336956du ^ (uint64_t)0x31bbf978u ^ (uint64_t)0xcd6f55fcu;
    return (uint32_t)(r ^ (r >> 32));
}

__attribute__((used, noinline))
uint32_t TokenizerBench___R1(TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens *p) {
    uint32_t m = xorshift32(0x366856bbu ^ (uint32_t)p->a);
    p->a ^= ((uint64_t)0x366856bbu << 32) | (uint64_t)m;
    p->b += p->a ^ (p->c + (uint64_t)0x72fcd409u);
    p->c = ((p->c ^ (uint64_t)0x3afd4cabu) << 24) | ((p->c ^ (uint64_t)0x3afd4cabu) >> 40);
    uint64_t r = p->a ^ p->b ^ p->c ^ (uint64_t)0x366856bbu ^ (uint64_t)0x72fcd409u ^ (uint64_t)0x3afd4cabu;
    return (uint32_t)(r ^ (r >> 32));
}

__attribute__((used, noinline))
uint32_t TokenizerBench___R2(TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens *p) {
    uint32_t m = xorshift32(0x046d6ad2u ^ (uint32_t)p->b);
    p->b ^= ((uint64_t)m << 32) | (uint64_t)0xc719f452u;
    p->c += p->b ^ (uint64_t)0x0fc1bdd9u;
    p->a = (p->a + (uint64_t)0x046d6ad2u);
    p->a = (p->a >> 21) | (p->a << 43);
    uint64_t r = p->a ^ p->b ^ p->c ^ (uint64_t)0xc719f452u ^ (uint64_t)0x046d6ad2u ^ (uint64_t)0x0fc1bdd9u;
    return (uint32_t)(r ^ (r >> 32));
}

__attribute__((used, noinline))
uint32_t TokenizerBench___R3(TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens *p) {
    uint32_t m = xorshift32(0xc55b15eeu + (uint32_t)p->c);
    p->a += ((uint64_t)m << 32) | (uint64_t)0x0d11e683u;
    p->c ^= p->a;
    p->c = (p->c >> 16) | (p->c << 48);
    p->b ^= (uint64_t)(0xc8e57b40u + m);
    uint64_t r = p->a ^ p->b ^ p->c ^ (uint64_t)0xc8e57b40u ^ (uint64_t)0x0d11e683u ^ (uint64_t)0xc55b15eeu;
    return (uint32_t)(r ^ (r >> 32));
}

__attribute__((used, noinline))
uint32_t TokenizerBench___R4(TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens *p) {
    uint32_t m1 = xorshift32(0xdaf09eaeu ^ 0xf6f1f787u ^ (uint32_t)p->a);
    uint32_t m2 = xorshift32(0xe0cf500du ^ (uint32_t)p->b);
    p->a ^= ((uint64_t)m1 << 32) | (uint64_t)m2;
    p->b += (uint64_t)(0xdaf09eaeu ^ m2);
    p->b = (p->b << 21) | (p->b >> 43);
    p->c = (p->c + p->a) ^ (uint64_t)(0xf6f1f787u ^ 0xe0cf500du);
    uint64_t r = p->a ^ p->b ^ p->c ^ (uint64_t)0xdaf09eaeu ^ (uint64_t)0xf6f1f787u ^ (uint64_t)0xe0cf500du;
    return (uint32_t)(r ^ (r >> 32));
}

__attribute__((used, noinline))
uint32_t derive_state(uint32_t seed) {
    TokenizerBench___Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens x = {
        seed,
        seed ^ 0x12345678ULL,
        seed + 0x9ULL
    };

    uint32_t s = seed;
    s ^= TokenizerBench___R0(&x);
    s ^= TokenizerBench___R1(&x);
    s ^= TokenizerBench___R2(&x);
    s ^= TokenizerBench___R3(&x);
    s ^= TokenizerBench___R4(&x);

    s = xorshift32(s);
    return s;
}

int main(void) {
    uint8_t encrypted[] = { 0xcf, 0x7a, 0xe5, 0x10, 0x3c, 0x49, 0xe6, 0x0b, 0x79, 0xcb, 0xf9, 0x3d, 0x00 };
    uint32_t s = derive_state(0xdeadbeef);

    for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(encrypted) - 1; i++) {
        s = xorshift32(s + 0xA5A5A5A5u);
        encrypted[i] ^= (uint8_t)(s & 0xffu);
    }

    puts((const char *)encrypted);
    return 0;
}

Below is the creation and execution of a 100,000-round binary.

python gen_fixture.py generate --seed 0xdeadbeef --rounds 100000 --message "Hello, World" --out fixture-100k.c --symbol-len 16 --symbol-pad 0
Wrote fixture-100k.c
Generated symbol prefix length: 16
Compile with:
gcc -O0 -g3 -gdwarf-5 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-inline -std=c11 fixture-100k.c -o fixture-100k.exe

gcc -O0 -g3 -gdwarf-5 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-inline -std=c11 fixture-100k.c -o fixture-100k.exe
.\fixture-100k.exe
Hello, World

The 100k-function binary was over 55 MB. Dynamic analysis could bypass this obfuscation with a single breakpoint, but the focus here is static analysis. The interesting part is that the number of functions scales easily for testing, and each function contributes to the final state. If the analysis is incomplete or incorrect, the derived decryption key will also be incorrect.

Tokenization Inflation

Once a prompt is sent to an LLM, it is tokenized into integers. A simple way to think about this is mapping chunks of text to IDs. These IDs are then used to index into the model’s embedding table. This may seem similar to compression algorithms, since both map variable-length sequences to codes. The difference is that tokenization uses a fixed vocabulary optimized for model performance, while compression builds or applies dictionaries to reduce size by exploiting repetition in the data.

A potential weakness in both compression and tokenization is that long inputs increase computational cost. Repetitive or structured data can also affect how efficiently it is represented as tokens. Most modern implementations handle this reasonably well, but there is still a cost.

In an executable, one of the most common ways to introduce large amounts of data is through strings. However, not all strings are surfaced or prioritized during analysis. One type of string that is often preserved and exposed is debug information. With GCC, DWARF debug metadata can be used to store extremely long function names. We can generate function names of arbitrary length using the Python script. By passing -g3 -gdwarf-5, GCC emits DWARF metadata. Disassemblers such as Binary Ninja, Ghidra, and IDA can read this metadata, recover the names, and in some workflows pass them along to an LLM, which then tokenizes the text. The following command generates 5 rounds with a function name length of 7,331 characters.

python gen_fixture.py generate --seed 0xdeadbeef --rounds 5 --message "Hello, World" --out fixture-p.c --symbol-len 7331 --symbol-pad 1337
Wrote fixture-p.c
Generated symbol prefix length: 8672
Compile with:
gcc -O0 -g3 -gdwarf-5 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-inline -std=c11 fixture-p.c -o fixture-p.exe

gcc -O0 -g3 -gdwarf-5 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-inline -std=c11 fixture-p.c -o fixture-p.exe

Below is a screenshot of a graph view in IDA. It gives a sense of how long the function names are, although they are truncated after 1024 characters in IDA.

Here is an example of a complete function name.

uint32_t __cdecl TokenizerBench__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char___0(TokenizerBench__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__DemangleLike__std__basic_string__char__std__char_traits__char__std__allocator__char__vector__pair__basic_string__int__PadXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX_Type__LongRecord__With__Lots__Of__Nested__Like__Tokens_0 *p) 

Combining the code complexity option with the large function names makes it so a large corpus of similar strings would be generated in a single function which might be taxing on a tokenizer. This attack can be easily defeated by not loading the debug/dwarf strings in the disassembler.

Summary

The goal is not to make binaries impossible to reverse, but to push LLM-based analysis into inefficient paths. One approach scales interdependent functions to force complexity. The other inflates token-heavy inputs through debug metadata to stress context limits and attention costs. These are better understood as attempts to trigger worst-case behavior in the analysis pipeline, not attacks on tokenization itself. This highlights a shift in where the pressure points are within LLMs. Context windows, token budgets, and attention scaling become part of the attack surface. If LLMs are used in reverse engineering workflows, understanding where they degrade may matter as much as improving their capability.

The next step is validating whether these ideas actually hold up in practice. That means testing them in a way in which I don't go broke with token cost and/or get banned by Anthropic or OpenAI. Odds are my first attempts will be locally using resources referenced in this gist.

Feel free to send me an email if you have any ideas at alexander dot hanel at gmail dot com.

Here is the source code: https://github.com/alexander-hanel/StressingLLMs

Codex’s Model Interaction & Inter-process Communication

Over the weekend I explored OpenAI’s Codex source code using Codex with the goal of understanding how it sends, receives, and processes responses from the API. Here is a link to the report. While going through it, I started thinking about inter-process communication (IPC) between Codex and other processes. In the coding agents I’m familiar with (Anthropic’s Claude Code and OpenAI’s Codex), there isn’t much support for receiving input from external processes, which raises a question I’ve had for a while: how does a third-party process communicate with the agent in a meaningful way? For example, if a command is blocked by a security provider like an EDR, the agent could simply generate a slightly modified version of that command and try again. But how would it know the block was due to a security event and shouldn’t be retried?

To explore this, I had Cursor modify its source to add IPC. The forked vibe coded version compiles and connects to OpenAI’s API just like a normal Codex install. It has a local file-based IPC surface so secondary processes can discover active sessions and submit feedback which gets added to the models context. While testing with multiple Codex instances, I accidentally ran a command to update README.md in the wrong terminal. Earlier, I had injected an “external security control” signal via a Python script, and the session responded with: 

“No. README.md was not updated. The edit attempt on README.md was blocked by an external security control, and the runtime indicated not to retry until that condition is cleared.” 

At first it didn’t make sense, then it registered that the previous tests had worked and the session context had been updated through the IPC channel. I thought it was fascinating because it opened a whole almost philosophical question: how would AI-Agents safely evaluate prompts from remote processes in the context of its current task? It shows how much trust matters in the context of AI-Agents. 

The README.md of the project is constructed as a learning guide. Enjoy.